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Thomas Curry's synopsis of church-state practices in seventeenth
and eighteenth century America is notable for its modesty and bal-
ance. When lawyers and judges paint the religious history of that pe-
riod they picture events like cows on a hillside-all pointing in the
same direction. (Of course the cows point different ways in different
pictures; it depends on which way the wind is blowing.) The scene
Curry describes is more disorderly. This makes it harder to identify
trends that we might say were embodied in first amendment princi-
ples. But it prefigures, and helps explain, our messy first amendment
practices.
Curry argues that two topics dominated church-state discussions
from 1600 to 1800: (1) the government's power to legislate about reli-
gion, and (2) public financial support for ministers. As to the first
issue, Americans gradually accepted the principle, espoused by Roger
Williams, that government had no power over matters of religious
worship and practice. But they did not live up to this principle. They
passed laws about sabbath observance, blasphemy, days of prayer and
fasting, and religious qualifications for office. In this, they followed
the practice of John Cotton, who thought that the two tables of the
Ten Commandments (religion and morals) must stand or fall to-
gether. "The principle was the principle of Williams, but the practice
was the practice of Cotton." As to the second issue, financial support
for ministers, practice converged more with principle. But there were
exceptions, as in New England. And those who opposed support
often did so for no principle more lofty than the fear that it would go
to the Church of England.
I want to make three points about this historical summary.
First, I think Curry is right in concluding that the picture he paints
does not settle many modem questions. This in itself is important.
For the past ten years, there has been a lot of controversy in Constitu-
tional Law circles about the role that the framers' intentions should
* Ashland Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. B.A., Notre
Dame University, J.D., Harvard Law School. Editors' Note: The paper commented on ap-
pears at 7 J. LAW & RELIG. 261 (1989).
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play in interpreting the Constitution. The political right is said to
believe that intentions should matter;1 the left, that they should not.2
Oddly enough, however, both sides look to history for answers when
interpreting the religion clauses.3 Curry's work suggests that they are
both wrong.
But what Curry says suggests a second, and perhaps more impor-
tant, point. It may be that history has a strong appeal in this area
because we find the same questions there. The two religious questions
that have most often engaged the Court's attention in this century are
remarkably like those Curry addresses. They are: first, the govern-
ment's power to legislate about religious belief and practice (in such
matters as school prayer 4 the teaching of evolution,' and creches6);
and second, public financial support for religious schools.7
The controversy over the first question is fueled by sentiments
remarkably like those that moved John Cotton to favor religious legis-
lation. It is often said, for example, that the anarchy in our public
schools dates from 1962, when prayer went out and left a vacuum to
be filled by secular humanism." We see at work here the conviction
that one cannot teach morality without religion-one cannot separate
the Second Table from the First. The Court has, somewhat inconsis-
tently, approved for adults the liturgy (creches, chaplains' prayers) it
denies to children. But it is hard to accept these diluted observances
as real acts of devotion. They are more like a kind of civil religion
that functions for the community the way songs and rituals do for the
1. See E. Meese, Speech before the American Bar Association (July 9, 1985), reprinted in
THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 1 (The Federalist Soci-
ety 1986).
2. See W. Brennan, Speech to the Text and Teaching Symposium, Georgetown Univer-
sity (Oct. 12, 1985), reprinted in THE GREAT DEBATE, supra note 1, at 11.
3. Compare Larson v. Valente 456 U.S. 228, 244-46 (1982) (Brennan, J.) with Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787-92 (1983) (Burger, C.J.), and Wallace v. Jaifree, 472 U.S. 38, 91
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
4. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Ed., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306 (1952); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985);
Board of Education v. Margens, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
5. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Edwards v. Aquillard, 482 U.S. 578
(1987).
6. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. -,
109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989); Chabad v. ACLU, 842 F.2d 655 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 488
(1988). Cf. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
7. See the cases cited in Garvey, Another Way of Looking at School Aid, 1985 Sup. CT.
REV. 61, 67 Table I.
8. Compare Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Abington School District v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963) with Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
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Lions, the Rotarians, and the Phi Gammas. They unite us in a com-
mon faith (the First Table) and thereby keep the peace (the Second
Table).
As to the second issue, financial support, it is hard to miss the
fact that Catholics have replaced Anglicans as the likely beneficiaries
of public financing. And it would be naive to suppose that this has
not played a part in the opposition to school aid. The debate is usu-
ally conducted on the higher plane of principle, but the school aid
cases are renowned for drawing lines that no principles can explain.
One can only say that here, as with the first issue, the Court has given
each side something. Some bus rides, books, and deductions are per-
missible; other bus rides, maps, and credits are not.9
The most arresting feature of this jurisprudence is its homemade
quality. The rules the Court has laid down-or perhaps I should just
say, the Court's decisions--seem to conform better to circumstances
than to theories. They have a very messy and pragmatic character,
with something for everyone. Curry notes the same phenomenon in
this period: "The tension between what Americans proclaimed and
what they did in matters of Church and State can be partially ex-
plained by the fact that Church-State developments emerged in re-
sponse to circumstances rather than to clear patterns of thinking."
This brings me to my third point: perhaps the reason why these
questions have shown such endurance is that the establishment clause
itself exalts pragmatism over principle. To put it more bluntly, per-
haps the clause cannot be made to do as much work as we would like
it to, and that is why we have this persistent muddle over church-state
relations.
When I say that the clause exalts pragmatism over principle, I
mean that it does not create rights like other provisions in the Bill of
Rights. Rights have the compelling quality of being able to trump
arguments of social utility.10 They thus steer us away from ad hoc
practices and lend a bit of consistency to government-private rela-
tions. But the establishment clause has proven hard to cram into the
rights mold.
A right must belong to some person-the right-holder, or claim-
ant."' Some rights identify that person by name. ("[The accused
9. See Garvey, supra note 7.
10. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY chs. 4, 7 (1977).
11. The person may be a legal 'person,' such as a corporation. First Nat'l Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial."' 2 ) Others give
strong hints. ("Freedom of speech" must belong to speakers.) But it
has never been exactly clear who can claim the benefit of the estab-
lishment clause. It speaks about relations between institutions, not
between individuals and government. It seems designed to prevent
the federal government from establishing a national church, and from
interfering with established churches in the states.' 3 The clause thus
regulates affairs between government and the churches, much as the
original Constitution regulates affairs between government and the
states. (We see this institutional aspect in modern cases where the
Court talks about entanglement.14)
Who in this scheme is the right-holder? Church-state relations
certainly have individual effects. But so do federal-state relations.' 5
And Article I does not give me a right that the federal government
not exceed its commerce power. I may raise the issue, but only as a
third party complaining on the states' behalf. I can't even do that
unless I can show some independent harm of my own (apart from the
violation)."
This is why we have had a succession of difficult establishment
clause standing cases--on school prayer, Engel 1" and Schempp;'8 on
school aid, Flast 19 and Valley Forge.20 Though the plaintiffs usually
get into court, they do so only because the Court has relaxed the usual
rules. School prayer plaintiffs can sue even if they are not coerced.
(Flag salute plaintiffs have to show coercion.2") School aid plaintiffs
can sue as taxpayers. (Maternity aid plaintiffs cannot.2 2 ) These
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
13. See the slightly varying accounts in R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
(1982); M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS ch. 1 (1965); W. KATZ, RELIGION
AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 8-10 (1964).
14. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985);
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664
(1970).
15. Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence ofFederalism after Gar-
cia, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 341, 380-395.
16. Com. of Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
17. Engel v. Vitale, 372 U.S. 421 (1962). See Sutherland, Establishment According to En-
gel, 76 HARV. L. REV. 25 (1962).
18. School District v. Schempp, supra note 4. See Brown, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custo-
des?-the School-Prayer Cases, 1963 Sup. CT. REV. 1.
19. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
20. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
21. Brown, supra note 18, at 31-33.
22. Com. of Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 477 (1923). See also United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
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claimants have a distinctly non-Hohfeldian character. Their role is to
bring problems to the Court's attention. But the Court does not re-
solve those problems by asking what are the contours of the plaintiffs'
rights... what kind of performance is due to them. Instead it asks
whether, all things considered, we want the government doing this.
Those who complain that the Supreme Court has not been con-
sistent about forbidding prayer and school aid sometimes lose sight of
this point. If the Court is not constrained by some principle like the
rights of the parties before it, it has discretion to draw lines in arbi-
trary places. Take school aid. Providing books but not maps is arbi-
trary, but there is nothing wrong with it. Legislatures do such things
all the time. The Court does too, where rights are not involved. In
separation of powers cases it takes a "pragmatic, flexible approach"23
so long as each branch can perform its "essential functions."24 It did
the same thing in federalism cases until 1985.25
This brings me to a second point about rights. Constitutional
rights entitle claimants to some kind of service (jury trial, counsel) or
forbearance (no unreasonable searches, no interference with abor-
tions) by the government. If the government falls down in its duty to
serve or forbear, the claimant suffers some recognizable harm: she is
unjustly convicted, gives birth to an unwanted child, etc. The occur-
rence of this harm is what entitles the claimant to complain. This is
how rights are violated.
The establishment clause seems to demand forbearance: "Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion[.]"
But in most of the modern cases it is hard to identify the individual
harm caused by a violation. Suppose that public school officials call
for voluntary prayer initiated by students. Or suppose the govern-
ment offers chapter I aid to students at all religious schools. These
practices are clearly unconstitutional under the current rules. The
first has the purpose, the second the effect, of aiding religion. But it is
not clear that they cause harm to the claimants who complain about
them.
This is not to say that there is no harm. We can construct sensi-
ble long-range, or slippery-slope, or cost-benefit arguments against
either practice, and any of these may suffice to forbid it under the
establishment clause. But we cannot reach into our hand and pull out
23. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Services, 433 U.S. 425, 422 (197-7).
24. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1973); Nixon v. Administrator of Gen.
Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 2618-22 (1988).
25. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 537-47 (1985).
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a right that trumps any card played by proponents of prayer or school
aid.
Let me conclude by adding a little perspective to what I have
said. If Curry is right about the predominant problems, principles,
and practices in seventeenth and eighteenth century America, then it
is remarkable how little things have changed. To be sure, there are
differences. We do not now have laws (against blasphemy, for exam-
ple26) that coerce religious choices. And we seldom have laws that
discriminate against one religion and in favor of another.27 But issues
of coercion and discrimination fit easily into the model of rights: coer-
cion violates the right of free exercise; discrimination violates the
right to equality.28 We continue to wrestle with problems of nondis-
criminatory assistance to religion. For all practical purposes, that is
the exclusive focus of the establishment clause. But it may be asking
too much to expect a simple answer to those problems, because the
clause eschews the path of rights in favor of pragmatism.
26. Compare People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 225 (1811) with Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97, 107 n. 15 (1968). And compare the reaction in Iran to Salman Rushdie's, Satanic Verses,
with the reaction in this country to Martin Scorsese's film based on Nikos Kazantzakis' The
Last Temptation of Christ.
27. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), is a fairly unusual case.
28. Cf. LOCKHART, KAMISAR, CHOPER & SHIFFRIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1122 (6th
ed. 1986) ("I think discrimination among religions-preference of one religion over another-
[should] be treated under the free exercise clause,") (remarks of Dean Choper).
